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COMMENTS
RIGHT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO STRIKE
In the last thirty years there has been an explosive increase in the num-
ber of public employees and today they constitute almost seventeen per
cent of the nation's working force.' With public employment continually
increasing 2 there has been substantial development in public employee
unionism,8 and in the future there may be a greater number of labor dis-
putes and consequently a rise in the number of public employee strikes.4
These statistics and predictions emphasize the need to determine the pre-
cise legal status of the right to strike in public employment. It will be the
subject of this comment to discuss the nature and validity of the theories
used to prohibit or permit such strikes. While this article will be con-
cerned with public employees in general, it will focus its attention to
actual strikes by public school teachers, since it is felt by leading com-
mentators that, because of their successes in the past, classroom teachers
will take the lead as public employees in using the strike to gain their ob-
jectives. 5
Court decisions almost uniformly deny public employees the right to
strike. 6 They support this position with the theory that a strike by public
1 In 1930, public employees constituted only about six per cent of the civilian labor
force. Smith & McLaughlin, Public Employment: A Neglected Area of Research and
Training in Labor Relations, 16 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 30, 31 (1962). "Population growth,
war and national defense, economic crises, technology, and the desire for additional
services have been responsible in the last 25 years for a phenomenal rise in employment
in public service." Seligson, A New Look at Employee Relations in Public and Private
Service, 15 LAB. L.J. 287, 298 (1964).
2 "It is estimated that by 1970, for every five employed persons there will be one
government employee; by 1980 the ratio will have increased to 1 out of 4." Weisenfeld,
Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16 LAB. L.J. 685, 687 (1965).
3 Id. at 687. For statistics see, Brinker, Recent Trends in Labor Unions in Government,
12 LAB. L.J. 13, 14-18 (1961).
4 Anderson, Disputes Affecting Govermnent Employees, 10 LAB. L.J. 707 (1959).
1; Supra note 2, at 697. Radke, Real Significance of Collective Bargaining for Teachers,
15 LAB. L.J. 795, 798 (1964). Wollett, The Public Employee at the Bargaining Table:
Promise or Illusion?, 15 LAB. L.J. 8 (1964).
6 Although there have been many strikes by public employees, very few of them
have reached the courts of last resort, and consequently there are few reported cases.
But see: City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (2d Dist. 1949); Norwalk Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Educ.,
138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 IMI. 2d 567, 207 N.E.
2d 427 (1965); City of Detroit v. Division 26 of the Amalgamated Ass'n. of St. Employ-
ees, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952); Goodfellow v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 312
Mich. 226, 20 N.W.2d 170 (1945); City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers' Guild,
100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957); City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalgamated
Assn. of St. Employees, 85 Ohio App. 153, 90 N.E.2d 711 (1949); Local 976, Int'l. Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. Grand River Dam Authority, 292 P.2d 1018 (Okla. 1956); City of
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employees would, in effect, be a strike against the government itself." This
could only lead to anarchy and chaos. As stated by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt:
militant tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of Govern-
ment employees. [A] strike of public employees manifests nothing less than
an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government
until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis
of Government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and
intolerable.8
In Norwalk Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Educ.,9 the court, in denying
Norwalk teachers the right to engage in a strike or work stoppage, quoted
Roosevelt's statement as having come to be regarded as gospel by the
executive heads of state and nation.' 0 The court also relied upon President
Calvin Coolidge's comment on the Boston Police Strike, that "there is no
right to strike against public safety by anybody anywhere at any time.""
In addition to judicial decisions denying the right of public employees
to strike, state legislatures are tending to specifically prohibit strikes. 12
Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958); Port
of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099
(1958). Contra, Local 266, Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Salt River Project, 78 Ariz. 30,
275 P.2d 393 (1954); Board of Trustees v. Now, 9 L.R.R.M. 789 (Ohio C.P. 1941).
For cases permitting a strike of public employees by statutory construction, see Los
Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal.
2d 684, 335 P.2d 905 (1960), 59 MICH. L. REV. 1260 (1961), 47 VA. L. REv. 338 (1961),
18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 297 (1961) (right to strike implied by statute giving transit
authority employees the right to engage in "concerted activities"). See also, Note, 75
HARV. L. REV. 391, 407-408 (1961).
7 SPERO, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER 15 (1948).
s Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to L. C. Stewart, President, National
Fed'n. of Fed. Employees, Aug. 16, 1937, in RHYNE, POWER OF MUNICIPALITIES TO
ENTER INTO LABOR CoNTRAcrs 24 (1941).
9 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
10 Id. at 273, 83 A.2d at 484.
11 Ibid. See also Message to Legislature 36, Jan. 4, 1961, where Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller of New York has recently said, "A strike or threat of a strike by public
employees is wrong in principle and utterly inconsistent with their special responsi-
bilities as public servants."
12 At least twelve states prohibit strikes of public employees by legislation: FLA. STAT.
5 839.221 (1963); HAWAII REV. LAWS S 5-8 (1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. S 17.455 (2) (1960);
MINN. STAT. ANN S 179.51 (Supp. 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. S 48-821 (1943); N.Y. Civ.
SERV. S 108; OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. S 4117.02 (Anderson 1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243-760
(1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43; S 215.2 (1964); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT, art. 5154-c (Supp.
1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-65 (Supp. 1964); Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (4) (1) (1963). See
also, Pruzan v. Board of Education of City of New York, 25 Misc. 2d 945, 209 N.Y.S.
2d 966 (1960) holding an anti-strike law constitutional. Contra, a number of bills have
been introduced in state legislatures which would grant the right to strike to all or
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Congress also has specifically prohibited employees of the United States
government from participating in a strike.18 The reason given for the pas-
sage of anti-strike laws, instead of relying on protection fashioned by the
courts, is that occasional threats of organized public employees and actual
strikes by them cause embarrassment not only to public officials but to
leaders of employee organizations, as well as tax the patience of the
public.14
The major theory advanced against public employees' strikes is the
sovereignty of the governmental employer. 15 This theory argues that the
people are the ultimate repository of authority. However, they can only
act through the sovereign state, which is the embodiment of the will of the
people. The state's employees are the means by which the will of the
people is effectuated, and herein they differ from private employees. The
government employee owes unquestioning loyalty and obedience to the
state, for to disobey the state is to disobey the will of the people. 16 A strike
against a governmental body is often thought of as equivalent to a revolt
against governmental authority,' 7 or tantamount to treason itself.' s
at least in some areas of public employment, but none has yet been enacted. Zander,
Trends in Labor Legislation for Public Employees, 83 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 1293, 1296
(1960).
18 Federal law declares that employees of the United States Government may not
participate in any strike, assert the right to strike against the Government, or know-
ingly belong to an organization of government employees that asserts such a right.
69 STAT. 624 (1955), 5 U.S.C. S 118-p-r (1964). For a discussion of other foreign coun-
tries' laws on the legality of strikes by government employees, see Brinker, Recent
Trends of Labor Unions in Government, 12 LAB. L.J. 13 (1961).
14 KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CIVIL SERVICE, 325 (1958).
15 For discussions of the sovereignty argument see, COMM. ON EMPLOYEE RELA-
TIONS IN PUBLIC SERVICE, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 57 (1942); Spero,
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 248 ANNALS 146 (1946); Agger, The Gov-
ernment and its Employees, 47 YALE L. J. 1109 (1938); Watt, The Divine Right of
Government by judiciary, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 409, 453 (1947).
16 The theory of sovereignty forms the basis of certain arguments by analogy.
The right to strike, it is argued, is analogous to the right to sue the state; unless the
sovereign permits, it cannot be done. Kaplan, Have Public Employees the Right to
Strike? No, 30 NAT'L. MUNic. REv. 518, 520 (1941). Some go so far as to compare all
government workers to the military forces and argue that the sovereign demands
the same loyalty and obedience from both. Agger, Supra note 15 citing from SPERO,
THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN A GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY 17-20 (1927).
17 "In the American system, sovereignty is inherent in the people. They can delegate
it to a government which they create and operate by law. They can give to that
government the power and authority to perform certain duties and furnish certain
services. The government so created and empowered must employ people to carry
on its task. Those people are agents of the government. They exercise some part of the
sovereignty entrusted to it. They occupy a status entirely different from those who
carry on a private enterprise. They serve the public welfare and not a private purpose. To
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The sovereignty theory, however, has been called a fiction. 19 The chief
fallacy lies in its failure to differentiate the government as a sovereign and
as an employer. In its latter capacity the government merely hires people
to perform services.20 In the normal course of events disputes arise which
are settled by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration. But these methods
may be insufficient, and employees may resort to a strike in an attempt to
enforce their position. This pattern in labor relations is not altered by the
fact that the employer involved is some unit or agency of the govern-
ment.
21
Another basis for denying the right to strike is that the authority of the
state depends in a large measure on its prestige. Therefore, public policy
cannot tolerate a strike which would inevitably weaken the state's pres-
tige.22 However, this argument has been criticized:
It is doubtful that the loss of a strike would cause such a loss of prestige as
to cause a breakdown of the state's authority. A greater loss might occur by
the resort to repressive labor policies. In any event no strike by government
employees has yet had the effect of causing a breakdown of the state's
authority.28
Furthermore, it is unlikely that such strikes would dampen the state's
prestige, since they have no political motive and are not aimed at the func-
tion of government itself. They are aimed at particular politicians or
say that they can strike is the equivalent of saying that they can deny the authority
of government and contravene the public welfare." Supra note 9, at 276, 83 A.2d at 485.
18 See City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalgamated Ass'n. of St. Employees, supra
note 6; see supra note 2, at 686.
19 Sovereignty theory has been criticized in other areas of the law. "It would seem
somewhat anomalous that American courts should have adopted the sovereign-immunity
theory in the first place since it was based upon the divine right of Kings." Holytz
v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 30-31, 115 N.W.2d 618, 620 (1961) (abrogating
the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort claims). See generally City of West
Frankfort v. United Ass'n. of Journeymen, 53 111. App. 2d 207, 202 N.E.2d 649 (1964).
20 Agger, supra note 15.
21 "Government employees like their counterparts in private enterprise are subject
to the same vicissitudes of insecurity of employment, rising prices, accident, illness
and old age. Everywhere, from the remotest corners of the earth to the most sophis-
ticated, people seek to assert a measure of control over the conditions under which
they live. The public employee, no less than his private counterpart, labors under the
same apprehensions and frustrations and seeks the same measure of fulfillment from
his daily chores." Weisenfeld, supra note 2, at 688. "Strikes in government employ-
ment have had the same causes as those in private employment." Note, 2 VAND. L. REV.
414, 445 (1949) citing ZISKIND, ONE THOUSAND STRiKEs OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
187 (1940).
22 Note, supra note 21, at 446.
23 ZISKIND, supra note 21, at 191, 249.
COMMENTS
administrators and in that respect are exactly like strikes in private
industry.24
Some authorities feel that since the profit motive is lacking in govern-
ment, there can be no conflict between the employer and employees for a
greater share of the profits as there is in private industry.25 However, the
absence of a profit motive is often compensated for by the constant pres-
sures for governmental economy.26 Also, government officials, strongly
motivated by a desire for advancement or for the added personal prestige
which results from outstanding agency records, often behave in much the
same fashion as do private employers.2 7
Yet, a fundamental difference exists between employment in private in-
dustry and employment in public industry, which renders strikes and
unionism inappropriate. The management of a governmental enterprise is
responsible to the body politic for the performance of the enterprise and
provisions of law often limit the management in many matters which in
private industry would be subject to the decision of the employer or
collective bargaining.28 In City of Springfield v. Clouse,29 the plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment to determine the right of the city to enter
into collective bargaining contracts with city employee labor unions. The
court, in holding that the collective bargaining contracts concerning
wages, hours, collection of union dues and working conditions were void,
said that:
Although executive and administrative officers may be vested with a certain
amount of discretion and may be authorized to act or make regulations in
accordance with certain fixed standards, nevertheless the matter of making
such standards involves the exercise of legislative powers. Thus qualifications,
tenure, compensation and working conditions of public officers and employees
are wholly matters of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or
contract .... 80
24 Baldwin, Have Public Employees the Right to Strike?-Yes, 30 NAT'L. MUNIC.
REV. 515, 516 (1960).
25 Sullivan, Labor Problems in Public Employment, 41 ILL. B.J. 432 (1957). See also,
Board of Education v. Redding, 32 Il. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); City of
Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1959).
26 Rains, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 8 LAB. L.J. 548, 549 (1957).
27 Agger, supra note 15, at 1110; Baldwin, supra note 24.
28 "For example, the following matters may be erased from the bargaining table
by law: (a) recruitment and promotions because they are governed by civil service
regulations; (b) retirement and pension programs because for financial and actuarial
reasons, they have been fixed by state law; (c) if an increase in teachers' salaries de-
pends upon expansion of the revenues available for the school district, the procedures
of collective bargaining are useless." Wollett, The Public Employee at the Bargaining
Table: Promise or Illusion?, 15 LAB. L.J. 8, 10 (1964). See also Radke, Real Significance
of Collective Bargaining for Teachers, 15 LAB. L.J. 795 (1964).
29 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947). 3o ld. at 1251, 206 S.W.2d at 543.
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Nevertheless, it is asserted that administrative officers frequently have
wide discretionary powers over working conditions 31 and many strikes
have been effective in improving working conditions. 2
It is contended that government employees are responsible for the pub-
lic welfare88 and are obligated to remain at their jobs.34 For example, the
right to strike would seem completely incongruous and improper for em-
ployees directly concerned with the public safety and preservation of
order.8 However, the state's interest in avoiding work stoppages is not the
same in all areas of public service.8 6 Few persons would argue that the
practical effect of a strike by the employees of the city municipal golf
course would be as threatening to the public health and safety as a strike
among employees of a private hospital. And a strike by employees of a
private contractor at Cape Kennedy would obviously have a potentially
more serious effect upon the public than a dispute among the employees of
a public school system.87 Rather than classify all public employees to-
gether some courts apply a distinction based upon whether the service per-
formed is governmental or proprietary in nature.38 These courts find it in-
81 "In public education, however, 54 per cent of the local school boards are fiscally
independent and they, therefore, determine their own budgets. For the other 46 per
cent of the school districts, which are fiscally dependent, a reviewing agency must
give approval to the school board's budget." Moskow, Collective Bargaining for Public
School Teachers, 15 LAB. L.J. 787, 792 (1964).
82 ZISKIND, supra note 21, at 254.
38 Rains, supra note 26, at 549.
84 This notion appears to stem from an 1892 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts involving the right of cities to restrict political activities of policemen.
The court, by Mr. Justice Holmes, said: "There are few employments for hire
in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech
... by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes
the employment on the terms which are offered him. On the same principle, the city
may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control." Mc-
Auliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892).
85 The city is certainly justified in placing certain restrictions on employees entrusted
with public health safety and welfare. This class would include policemen, firemen,
health officers and others similarly situated. Note, 4 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 137, 138
(1965).
36 See, e.g., Rains, supra note 26; Weisenfeld, supra note 2, at 702.
87 Anderson, supra note 4, at 708; for other similar comparisons of the gravity of the
consequences involved in strikes by public and private employees, see Keyes, Right to
Strike by Employees, 31 DICTA 267-275 (1954); Agger, supra note 15, at 1130.
8 E.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Salt River Project, 78 Ariz. 30, 275
P.2d 393 (1954); Board of Trustees v. Now, 9 L.R.R.M. 789 (Ohio C.P. 1941). This
distinction has been rejected by the majority of courts, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los
Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (2d Dist.
1949); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324
P.2d 1099 (1958).
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congruous to say that if a utility worker is working for a non-public em-
ployer he has the right to strike and perhaps imperil the welfare and safety
of the public, whereas the same man, working for a government-operated
utility, would not have the right to strike.3 9 Thus, these courts allow
strikes by public employees engaged in operations similar to activities
in the private sphere.40
ALTERNATIVES TO THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKE
In light of the sentiment against public employee strikes, some au-
thorities feel that the public employee should only have recourse to
other methods to settle their disputes. 41 The primary alternatives to the
strike which are available to public employees are political persuasion
and pressure, mediation, compulsory arbitration, picketing and strike
threats.
Political persuasion and pressure by public employee groups is said
to be the best substitute for economic pressure.42 Lobbying and political
pressures, brought upon those in authority,43 are tactics natural to gov-
ernment and are better understood by the legislature and executive than
the traditional theories of collective bargaining.44 Well organized legis-
lative and political programs by powerful public employee unions can
result in new laws providing for increases in wages and may suggest
new sources of revenue which can be used to give increased benefits. 45
Even so, there has been a considerable difference of opinion as to whether
or not political pressures should be employed by public servants. In
1960, when President Eisenhower vetoed a bill granting a pay raise to
postal employees, he openly criticized the concealed pressures asserted
on members of Congress. 4" Some courts have gone farther than criti-
cism and have placed restrictions on the right of public employees to
organize or participate actively in politics. They have, in effect, pre-
39 Rains, supra note 26, at 549. 40 Supra note 37.
4' Note, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1360, 1365 (1940).
42 Anderson, supra note 4, at 709.
43 "The process is not unlike the pressures developed in major private disputes
when the parties seek the help of the executive to bring about the settlement of a dispute
by exerting some form of pressure upon the parties to the dispute." Id. at 709-710. The
recent air-lines strike is an example where we have seen requests for executive help.
44 The postal employees are a good example of public employee groups which tra-
ditionally apply strong and effective political pressures to achieve their legislative goals.
Smith and McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 37 n. 29.
45 Wortman, Collective Bargaining Strategies and Tactics in the Federal Civil
Service, 15 LAB. L.J. 482, 489-490 (1964).
46 Smith & McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 37 n. 29.
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vented them from crystallizing public opinion so as to change the em-
ployment practices of their employer.47
A few states, in an effort to avoid strikes by public employees, have
provided for mediation wherein a neutral third party is employed to
help the parties reach a voluntary agreement.48 Though neither party
is compelled to accept the recommendations of the mediator, the media-
tion process is still valuable for it may remove the emotional walls
separating the parties and improve the communication lines between
them.4 Nevertheless, it is still questionable whether mediation is an
adequate substitute for the right to strike because in most instances pub-
lic employees are denied access to the various arbitration and mediation
boards set up under federal and state labor relation acts.50
A third alternative to the strike is compulsory arbitration, which has
occasionally been authorized by statute or municipal charter.51 Legisla-
tion providing for arbitration is based on the view that uninterrupted
public service is absolutely essential. 52 In the absence of such legislation
courts tend to consider any arbitration agreement entered into as an
unlawful delegation of governmental authority.53 Even where com-
pulsory arbitration is authorized problems exist which discourage its use as
a strike alternative. In most areas of public employment, collective bargain-
ing is new and undeveloped, thus, inexperienced bargainers tend to rely
47 For examples of restrictions on the organization of public employees, see cases:
Perez v. Bd. of Police Commissioners 75 Cal. App. 2d 368, 178 P.2d 537 (1947); CIO
v. Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Seattle High School v. Sharpies, 159
Wash. 424, 293 Pac. 994 (1930). For examples of restrictions on political activities, see
cases: Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); U.S. Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
4 8 See ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 243.750, 662.435 (Supp. 1963); WIs. STAT. § 111.70(4) (b)
(1963); of particular interest is MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.45(1)-(8) (Supp. 1963).
49 For full discussion of the mediation process in the area of public employment,
see Moskowitz, Mediation of Public Employee Disputes, 12 LAB. L.J. 54 (1961);
Chisholm, Mediating The Public Employee Dispute, 12 LAB. L.J. 56 (1961).
50 E.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 5154-c (Supp. 1964): "It is declared to be against the
public policy of the State of Texas for any official or group of officials to recognize
a labor organization as the bargaining agent for any group of public employees."
See also Westwood, The Right of an Employee of the United States Against Arbitrary
Discharge, 7 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 212 (1938).
51 E.g., 92 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801-823 (Supp. 1964); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 28-9.1-
1-9.2-14 (Supp. 1964). Sometimes such arbitration is limited to disputes arising under
an existing labor contract. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-422 (1958).
52 One union executive notes that there is little that can be done if the governmental
employer does not grant the union requests: "For this reason ... there should be some
form of compulsory arbitration machinery in lieu of the right to strike." Wortman,
supra note 45, at 490.
53 E.g., Everett Fire Fighters v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 2d 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955).
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on arbitration to settle every major disagreement and are confronted
with an uncontrollable work load.5 4
Picketing can also be used as a legitimate tactic by public employees.
Although picketing was once held to fall "within that area of free dis-
cussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution,"55 the Supreme Court has
since declared that "picketing by an organized group is more than free
speech" 56 and it has been held constitutional for a state to enjoin peaceful
picketing which is "aimed at preventing effectuation [of] some public
policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced
by its legislature or its courts. '57 This rule has been applied to uphold
the granting of injunctions to prohibit picketing by public employees.58
However, in these cases the picketing was carried on in conjunction with
a strike or had the immediate purpose of a work stoppage. 59 Nevertheless,
when picketing does fall within the constitutionally protected area estab-
lished by the Supreme Court,60 it alone will not suffice to ensure the
equitable resolution of labor-management disputes. When picketing is
employed against the Government while the Government continues to
be judge and jury, the bargaining process strains the principle of good
faith to the upmost.61
Some labor practitioners agree that the threat to strike may be a more
effective weapon than the strike itself, for it may not turn out to be as
hard to live with as feared. Also, a prolonged strike inflicts serious harm
on the strikers and the danger of a break in ranks. By instilling fear in
the community and mobilizing pressure on the management of the enter-
prise the union can have its demands answered without reverting to the
actual strike.62 But it remains doubtful whether strike threats will be
5 4
HERRICK, UNIONS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES-THEIR IMPLICATIONS, N.Y.U.
FIFTEENTH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. LAW 129, 135 (1962).
55 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). See also, Comment, 15 DEPAUL
L. REv. 331 (1966).
56 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957).
57 Id. at 293.
58 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.
2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Bd. of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567,
207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
59 Ibid.
60 For example, the parade of the members of the Chicago Teachers Union on the
Board of Education offices in January, 1961. Chicago Sun Times, Jan. 11, 1961, p. 1.
col. 1 (final turf ed.).
61 Note, 75 HARV. L. REv. 391, 412 (1961), citing ABA LABOR RELATIONS LAW, PRO-
CEEDINGS 90 (1959).
62 For a full discussion of the strike threat alternative and its actual use see, Wolletr,
supra note 28, at 12-13.
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genuinely effective for they tend to alienate the public opinion and sup-
port which is needed in order to finance improvements in the economic
welfare and work situation of public employees.63 The alternatives to the
strike previously discussed are limited tools, but public employees con-
sider it important that they be provided with a substitute for the strike
weapon and have even struck to achieve such a substitute. 64
The American Bar Association at its 1955 meeting recognized the
urgent need for some type of system whereby public employees could
settle their grievances. Commenting on the dichotomy of Government's
encouraging full freedom of association and bargaining rights to employees
in private industry, but denying similar rights to its own employees, the
ABA said:
Government which denies to its employees the right to strike against the
people, no matter how just might be the grievances, owes to its public servants
an obligation to provide working conditions and standards of management-
employee relationships which would make unnecessary and unwarranted any
need for such employees to resort to stoppage of public business. It is too
idealistic to depend solely on a hoped-for beneficent attitude of public ad-
ministrators. Promises of well-meaning public officials imbued with a sense
of high authority who resort to the pretense of alleged limitations on their
powers to avoid dealing forthrightly with representatives of their subordinate
employees only aggravate grievances. Some practical machinery for handling
grievances, fancied or real, needs to be provided to insure to employees
that public management is concerned with their just complaints.
Every public jurisdiction should carefully review its laws pertaining to
the conditions of service of public employees to be sure they meet present
day concepts of sound employee relationships.6 5
INEFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-STRIKE LEGISLATION
Regardless of the legal status of public employee strikes as determined
by statute or case decisions, the fact remains that public employees do
have disputes with their employers and do engage in strikes.66 As with
so many other problems in law and morals, merely stating thou shall not
63 Ibid.
64 The recent strike of social workers in New York City involved among other
things, such an issue. See, Address by Al Bilik, President, Cincinnati AFL-CIO, Uni-
versity of Chicago Conference on Public Employment and Collective Bargaining,
Feb. 5, 1965.
65 Cornell, Collective Bargaining by Public Employee Groups, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 43,
56 (1958) citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECOND REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON LABOR RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES (1955).
66 From 1947 through 1959 more than 450 strikes were called by public employees.
Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 391, 407 (1961). A recent study illustrates the failure of anti-
strike legislation; in New York the average annual number of public employee strikes
increased after the passage of a no-strike law. Krislov, Work Stoppages of Government
Employees, 1942-59, I.Q. REV. OF ECONOMICS & Bus. 87 (1961).
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does not automatically prevent lawbreaking.6 7 In light of the actual public
employee strikes contrary to law there has been much criticism of anti-
strike legislation, especially where the recorded penalties are severe. While
violation of the federal government's no strike law is a criminal offense,68
state statutory provisions do not generally contain criminal sanctions.
Instead they call for the dismissal of public employees engaging in
strikes.69 Although some states do permit the reinstatement of striking
employees under certain conditions 70 most statutes calling for dismissal
are inflexible. 71 They offer the public administrator no choice of alter-
natives, such as fines or suspension, which could be based on the facts
and circumstances of the individual case.
The effectiveness of harsh penalties such as discharge or imprisonment
has been negligible for several reasons. First, severe penalties are rarely
a deterrent to a strike by public employees who believe present conditions
are intolerable and no other practical alternatives to the strike exist.12
Secondly, even when the statute gives a public official discretion to invoke
certain penalties against striking employees, the penalties are rarely in-
voked when strikes do occur. Public officials in metropolitan communities
which employ a large number of workers and where organized labor has
great political strength are reluctant to seek injunctive relief because of
possible political repercussions. 78 The principal concern of the public
official is to see that services are resumed as promptly as possible. Ob-
viously, the best way to accomplish this is to induce the employees to
return to work.74 Where the statute provides no discretion a similar result
67 Anderson, supra note 4, at 707.
68 69 Stat. 624 (1955), 5 U.S.C. SS 118-p-r (1964). Violation of the act is a felony;
it is punishable by a fine of up to $1,000, imprisonment of up to one year and a day,
or both. Supra note 13.
69 E.g., TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. art. 5154-c(3) (Supp. 1964): "Any such (public) employee
who participates in such a strike shall forfeit all civil service rights, re-employment
rights and any other rights, benefits, or privileges which he enjoys as a result of his
employment or prior employment."
7 0 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 S 215.3 (Supp. 1964).
71 Supra note 69.
72 "The recent strikes of teachers and welfare workers in New York City was in
direct violation of law and resulted in the case of the latter dispute in the jailing of
the strike leaders for criminal and civil contempt. . . ." Weisenfeld, Public Employees-
First or Second Class Citizens, 16 LAB. L. J. 685, 695 (1965).
78 Moberly, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis. L. Rzv.
549, 551 (1966).
74 In 1957, motormen and other employees of the New York City Transit Authority
engaged in an illegal strike. When asked why the strict statutory penalties provided by
the state of New York for engaging in an illegal strike were not invoked, the chief
administrator replied: "We'd never have got the subways running." N.Y. Times, Dec.
29, 1957, § 4, p. 4, col. 4.
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is also reached since strikers may refuse to return to work until they
receive guarantees of immunity from the statutory penalties. Moreover,
in many cases, it is physically impossible to resume services unless they
are rehired.75
In a recent New York case,76 a group of school teachers sought to have
the Condon-Waldin Act declared unconstitutional. 7 The Act provided
that public employees absenting themselves from their positions in an
effort to change conditions of employment or compensation shall termi-
nate their employment. 78 Though the court upheld the Act, it spoke out
against its harsh penalties.
A word may not be amiss, at this juncture, about the desirability that the
Condon-Waldin Act be clarified as to some features. . . . It is thought by
some that at least one reason for the general reluctance of public officials to
invoke the Act is the severity of some of its provisions .... Leading news-
paper editorials and many magazine articles have urged revision of the Condon-
Waldin Act by easing penalties and providing state machinery for giving
the fullest and most considerate hearing to grievances of public employees. 79
Legislation which provides for inflexible and harsh penalties to be invoked
against striking employees, without providing them with alternatives to
voice their grievances, is correctly criticized as being unduly negative.80
ILLEGAL STRIKES BY PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
In recent years, the teaching profession has erupted with demands for
consideration of its views. Still making obeisance to their professional
status, teacher organizations behave like trade unions as they discuss mu-
tual problems with their respective Boards of Education.8 From 1940
through 1965 public school teachers were involved in 107 actual work
stoppages,82 and school board members are deeply concerned that teacher
militancy will increase in the future. 83 Some reasons for this growing
75 See Note, Union Activity in Public Employment, 55 COLuM. L. REv. 343, 360-
61 (1955).
76 Pruzan v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 25 Misc. 2d 945, 209 N.Y.S.2d 966
(1960).
77 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 108 (1963). 78 Ibid.
79 Supra note 76, at 956, N.Y.S.2d at 977-978.
80 Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARV. L. REv. 391, 410 (1961).
81 Supra note 7, at 694.
82 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, Bu.EAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, March, 1966. For an under-
standing of the extent and duration of past and present strikes see SCHNAUFER, THE
USES OF TEACHER POWER 28-30 (1966).
83 A National School Board Survey conducted in 1964 found that 34 state school
board associations believed the number of board-teacher disputes would increase in
number and significance in their own state. Radke, Real Significance of Collective Bar-
gaining for Teachers, 15 LA. L.J. 707, 798 (1959).
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militancy by teachers are: (1) the steady growth in the size of school
districts making the personal relationships which once existed in many
districts more difficult to achieve, (2) frequently teachers salaries are not
equal to those in other professions or to wages paid for jobs of less im-
portance and requiring less training and skill, (3) the male percentage of
the teaching force is increasing and the turnover in the teaching profes-
sion has declined, (4) the interest of labor unions in attracting teachers
to memberships, and (5) the success of strikes conducted by teachers
elsewhere.8 4 In recent years, teachers have struck or threatened strikes in
defiance of anti-strike laws. The result in almost every instance was an
accomplishment of some, if not all, of the desired objectives, without
penalty.
In September of 1961 Utah teachers called off their threatened close-
down of the schools in all 40 districts after reaching an agreement with
the Governor on a procedure for determining how additional revenue
for public education would be appropriated.85 Teachers in Hamtramck,
Michigan, conducted a four day union meeting until the school board
agreed to terms and signed the first contract in any Michigan school
district.88 In South Bend, Indiana, after teachers struck for four days and
65 Notre Dame faculty members signed a petition supporting their de-
mands fqr a higher salary schedule, the striking teachers received tele-
grams to return to work or be fired. Only after the firing threat was
rescinded and an agreement for an orderly discussion of the grievances
was reached did the teachers return to work.8 7 One of several successful
strikes called by teachers in 19668 was held in Plainview, Long Island.
There the school board and the state commissioner of education called
in strikebreakers and threatened the loss of teaching certificates. After
the threat was rescinded, the teachers returned to work with a compre-
hensive contract including a salary increase and improved working con-
ditions.89
CONCLUSION
From these successful strikes it is apparent that public school teachers
have been willing to disregard statutory prohibitions against strikes in an
effort to better their positions. It seems no less likely that public em-
ployees in other areas will follow this lead and resort to strikes, if neces-
84 Id. at 799-800. 85 Moskow, supra note 31, at 793.
86 Supra note 72, at 694; also AFL-CIO NEWS, May 22, 1965.
87 Ibid.
88 See also, Detroit Free Press, June 3, 1966, p. 1, col. 2 (strikes held in four sub-
urban Detroit, Michigan, school districts),
89 SCHNAUFER, supra note 82, at 11.
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sary, to accomplish their goals. Flatly prohibiting public employees the
right to strike"0 is clearly not the answer to the problem. To continue to
deny grievance procedures or not to provide alternative solutions to pub-
lic employee disputes can only lead to more serious disputes. This will
result in a lower level of morale among public employees and a lower
standard of public service.
The use of a Public Employees' Act which denies the right to strike
to all public employees9' is no more equitable than a criminal law statute
which calls for the same punishment irrespective of the crime committed.
Different areas of public employment should be classified into categories
which establish or deny the right to strike according to the nature of the
employment. A test which can be employed to categorize areas of em-
ployment is, "the nature and gravity of the consequences involved in a
strike by that area of employment. '92 Using this test three categories
may be arrived at. First, as to those areas of public employment control-
ling public health and safety,98 the right to strike against the government
should be denied. However, other means of mediation and arbitration
should be opened. Secondly, in areas which do not directly affect public
health and safety but are practically indispensable to society's everyday
functioning,9 4 the right to strike should be granted subject to provisions
reminiscent of the Emergency Dispute procedures of the Taft-Hartley
Acts 5 where the governor of each state is given authority to invoke an
80-day cooling-off period. Finally, in those areas of public employment
where a strike against the government would present no threat to public
health or safety, nor inconvenience the functioning of everyday society, 6
the right to strike should be the same as in private industry.
In private industry it is government itself, in its role as lawmaker, which
9 0 E.g., Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951);
Board of Educ. v. Redding 32 111. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); City of Manchester
v. Manchester Teachers' Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957); City of Pawtucket
v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958). Contra, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 839.221 (1963); HAWAII REV. LAWS §S 5-8 (1955); MICH. STAT. ANNt. § 17.455 (2)(1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 179.51 (Supp. 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. 48-821 (1943).
91 Supra note 69.
92 Each area is categorized by viewing the potential injury to a particular state by
a strike in that section of government employment.
93 This category would include policemen, firemen, health officials, and others
similarly situated.
94 This class would include teachers, transit workers, welfare workers, sanitation
workers and others similarly situated.
95 61 Stat. 155 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1958).
96 This class would include, for example, employees of a state, owned liquor store,
employees of municipal golf cvuJses gn 9thers similarly situated,
